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THE LEAST VULNERABLE BRANCH: ENSURING
THE CONTINUITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Randolph Moss' and Edward Siskel++
On March 13, 2002, just six months after the September 11 terrorist
attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., Justice Anthony
Kennedy testified at a House subcommittee hearing on contingency
planning for the federal government in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack.' In assessing whether members of the judiciary should be
sequestered in an undisclosed location as part of the "shadow
government" along with representatives of the other branches, Justice
Kennedy stated: "We wonder about the necessity [of being part of the
shadow government]. All . . . district and circuit judges are courts of
general jurisdiction and can issue writs under the All Writs Act. So we
are already dispersed nationwide.", 2 During a hearing of the Continuity
of Government Commission held on September 23, 2002, Judge Robert
Katzmann echoed Justice Kennedy's comments, stating that "[t]he
Federal judiciary, unlike the other branches of government, is dispersed
across the nation and so it does not confront the same kinds of issues that
this Commission will consider with respect to the other branches.,
3
Justice Kennedy's and Judge Katzmann's assessments of the Supreme
Court's vulnerability in a post-9/11 world are typical of the general
attitude toward the Court in the continuity of government discussion
thus far. In the conversation after September 11 about ensuring the
continued functioning of our political institutions during a national
emergency, the Supreme Court has often been treated as the least
vulnerable of the three branches of government.
+ Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. Mr. Moss previously served as
the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of
Justice.
++ Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP.
1. Charles Lane, After September 11 'h, Judiciary Rethinks the Unthinkable, WASH.
POST, Apr. 12, 2002, at A29.
2. Id.
3. The Continuity of Government Commission, 2002 CONTINUITY GOV'T
COMMISSION PROC., available at http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/020923
transcript.pdf (Sept. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Continuity Commission]. Judge Katzmann
noted, "it is worth considering the consequences of an attack on the Supreme Court even
if at the end of the day we were to conclude that present arrangements serve us ... better
than the other alternatives." Id.
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While there are clear reasons why we might be less concerned about
the Supreme Court, some of which were mentioned by Justice Kennedy
and Judge Katzmann, and others which will be discussed below, it is not
self-evident that the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary can readily
weather a crisis of the sort that we must now contemplate after
September 11.4 Although federal courts are dispersed nationwide and
power within the judiciary is decentralized, the full force and uniformity
of federal law depends on the continued functioning of the Supreme
Court. The absence of the Supreme Court at a time of national crisis-
though not necessarily debilitating to the federal judiciary-could
exacerbate the crisis. The question becomes: Do we need to worry about
the continuity of the Supreme Court? This article answers that question
with a measured yes, and then analyzes possible solutions to the problem
both in terms of their constitutionality and their soundness as a matter of
public policy.
Part I of this article raises the question of whether there is a continuity
problem for the Supreme Court at all. Although the death or incapacity
of four or more Supreme Court Justices would leave the Court without
the quorum necessary to hear and decide cases, the Constitution already
provides mechanisms for filling vacancies on the Court-the
Appointments Clause and (at least as a matter of historic practice) the
Recess Appointments Clause.5 These mechanisms have served us well
for over two hundred years, providing relatively smooth transitions as
vacancies on the Court have opened and filled.6 Moreover, history has
shown that many controversial cases-including some that involve
executive and legislative responses to national crises-took many
months, if not years, to reach the Supreme Court. In most of these cases,
there is no evidence that the delay in reaching a final resolution, as the
issue wound its way through the lower courts, created or exacerbated a
constitutional crisis. In fact, there have been times in the Court's history
when it was unable to convene for lack of a quorum or for other reasons
and the country did not descend into chaos because of the absence of the
Court.7 Thus, even if the appointment process is time consuming, we
4. Id.
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2-3.
6. See Thomas A. Curtis, Recess Appointments to Article Ill Courts: The Use of
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretations, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758, 1773-90
(1984).
7. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3 ("[I]n 1811, the Court did not sit for an
entire year because there was no quorum. And in 1866 and 1867, there was almost a
period of two years where the Court did not sit.., we've survived it.").
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may have more time than we think to fill vacancies on the Court before
the absence of a quorum has any lasting negative impact.
Nevertheless, it is likely that a terrorist attack of the magnitude that we
are contemplating (i.e., one that would require a plan for the continuity
of the three branches of the federal government), and our response to
that attack, would present constitutional and statutory questions of a
different order and immediacy than anything the courts have faced thus
far in our Nation's history. If cases addressing these questions were
working their way through the courts at a time when the Supreme Court
was unable to exercise its constitutional function, the cost to the
legitimacy of the government's actions and the risk to individual liberties
could be enormous.
Therefore, Part I concludes that there is, in fact, cause for concern
about the continuity of the Supreme Court during such a catastrophic
event, and the problem is sufficiently serious that we should address it
now, before a period of crisis. We are nevertheless aware that the crisis
we imagine and seek to avoid is contingent on a confluence of events that
are unlikely to occur all at once. The remainder of our analysis,
therefore, maintains a healthy skepticism towards designing a solution to
a problem that may exist only in the highly unlikely event of a worst case
scenario.
Part II describes the nature of the problems that could arise in the
aftermath of a terrorist attack resulting in the death or incapacitation of
several Justices. The problem of continuity of the Supreme Court
depends in large part on the impact of the attack on the other branches
of government. Because the appointment of replacement Justices
requires the advice and consent of the Senate, whether those vacancies
can be filled without significant delay depends on whether a quorum
exists in the Senate.8 Similarly, the authority of newly appointed Justices
might depend on the legitimacy of the nominating acting-President's
claim to that office. However, aside from the various permutations
regarding the state of the other branches, the core problem remains the
same: how to resolve the tension between restoring the Supreme Court
to a quorum quickly, while at the same time preserving its legitimacy.
In Part III, we consider the various solutions that have been proposed
for ensuring the continuity of the Court in a time of crisis. Among those
proposals are: (1) imposing a time limit on the Senate's advice and
consent; (2) requiring the President to consult with the Senate before
making any recess appointments and/or requiring some ideological
balance among the recess appointees; (3) lowering the Court's quorum
8. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
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requirement; (4) designating certain offices in advance to fill vacancies
on the Court; and (5) creating an intermediate court between the courts
of appeals and the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the
circuits and provide a higher authority on questions of extreme national
importance. We consider whether these various proposals could be
enacted by statute or would require a constitutional amendment. We
also evaluate whether the various proposals successfully resolve the
tension between timely restoration and legitimacy.
Finally, in Part IV, we choose among these options and recommend
that Congress pass a statute creating an intermediate court drawn from
any remaining Justices and the chief judges of the courts of appeals. This
court would convene in times of national emergency when the Supreme
Court lacks a quorum as a result of that emergency, and it would exercise
limited discretionary jurisdiction over appeals from the courts of appeals
and state supreme courts in cases of immediate, national importance.
We believe creating an intermediate court with limited jurisdiction would
not require a constitutional amendment because Congress has the power
to create inferior courts9 and, at least prospectively, the nomination and
confirmation of a court of appeals judge would encompass that judge's
potential service on this emergency court. As for sitting judges, we
believe they could also serve on the court without violating the
Appointments Clause because Congress has the authority to expand the
duties of an officer so long as the new duties are "germane" to those that
the officer exercised originally. 0 Ultimately, we conclude that this option
provides the best balance between a smooth, immediate transition, and a
decisionmaker that would have much, if not all, of the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court.
Justice Kennedy and Judge Katzmann are certainly right that the
distribution of federal courts throughout the country, combined with the
power delegated to judges at each level of the judiciary, ensures that
courts will be available to resolve the vast majority of disputes in the
aftermath of an attack. But a continuity plan for the Court is necessary
for that small category of highly controversial cases involving challenges
to our constitutional framework and individual liberties during a national
emergency, in which the need for a functioning and authoritative
Supreme Court is most pronounced.
9. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9.
10. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893).
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I. Do WE NEED TO WORRY ABOUT THE CONTINUITY OF THE
SUPREME COURT?
Unlike Congress, the Supreme Court is not constitutionally required to
have a quorum to act." In fact, the Constitution says nothing about the
size of the Court. Since 1948, however, the Supreme Court by statute
must have a quorum of at least six Justices who are able to hear and rule
on a case before it may exercise jurisdiction. 3 Although the Court has
followed the "Rule of Four" in granting petitions for writ of certiorari
since at least 1925,4 and only five votes are necessary for an opinion of
the Court, without a quorum of six, the Court cannot convene to vote on
certiorari petitions or hear and decide cases. In the absence of a quorum,
the remaining Justices must determine whether "the case cannot be
heard and determined at the next ensuing term."" If a majority of these
Justices find that this will not be possible, then "the court shall enter its
order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was
brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally
divided court.' ' 6 In other words, the judgment is affirmed but the act of
affirmance has no precedential effect.
In the aftermath of a large-scale terrorist attack on Washington, D.C.
similar to the attacks of September 11, it is certainly possible that four or
more Supreme Court Justices might be killed or incapacitated, thereby
leaving the Court without a quorum. In this situation, the Court would
not be able to vote on certiorari petitions, hear cases, or issue opinions
11. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
12. See id.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
14. See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
10 (1983); see also Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule of Four, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975-76
(1957).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2000).
16. Id. Section 2109 also provides that if the case is on direct appeal from a district
court, the Chief Justice:
may order it remitted to the court of appeals for the circuit including the district
court in which the case arose, to be heard and determined by that court either
sitting in banc or specially constituted and composed of the three circuit judges
senior in commission who are able to sit, as such order may direct.
Id.
17. See Nick Fielding, Masterminds of 9/11 Reveal Terror Secrets, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Sept. 8, 2002, at 1 (stating that on September 11, the fourth plane that crashed
in Pennsylvania was heading for the Capitol building). Given the proximity of the
Supreme Court building, it is not difficult to imagine the Court being targeted as well. See
Lane, supra note 1 (stating that only two of the Justices were in the building on the
morning of September 11).
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until a quorum was restored. 8 Cases could be held over until the next
term or they could be affirmed without precedential effect, but the Court
could not resolve them until enough vacancies were filled.' 9
The means for the President to fill vacancies on the Court and restore
a quorum are specified in the Appointments Clause of the Constitution."'
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President "shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges
of the supreme Court."'" If a terrorist attack left the Court without a
quorum, the President could use his appointment power to nominate
replacements and, together with the Senate, restore a quorum to the
Court. This assumes, however, that there is a President to make
nominations and a Senate that can provide "Advice and Consent" on
22those nominees.
In a large-scale attack on Washington, D.C. that could render the
Court without a quorum, it is also possible that a large number of
senators could be killed or incapacitated as well. The Seventeenth
Amendment already provides a mechanism for the speedy replacement
of senators through temporary appointments by the governor of the
senator's home state,23 but the process of restoring a quorum to the
18. Continuity Commission, supra note 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § t (setting the quorum
of the Court).
19. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
20. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. amend. XVII, cl. 2. The Seventeenth Amendment states:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the
executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
Id. Forty-six states have authorized their governors to make temporary appointments
pursuant to the Seventeenth Amendment (only Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Wisconsin have declined to do so). See Act of July 31, 2004, ch. 236, 2004 Mass. Acts,
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw04/slO40236.htm; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 12-
101(a); OR. REV. STAT. § 188.120 (2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 17.18 (West 2003); SULA P.
RICHARDSON & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., HOUSE AND SENATE
VACANCIES: How ARE THEY FILLED? 2 (2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Vacancies.pdf (updated Jan. 22, 2003). But see Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 12-101.B. (West Supp. 2004). Section 12-101(b) states:
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs after March 1 of any
even-numbered year if the term of the office expires the following year. In such
a case, the candidate elected to the office at the regular General Election shall be
appointed by the Governor to fill the unexpired term.
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Senate may nevertheless take a significant amount of time, particularly in
the aftermath of a devastating attack. There also may be some
uncertainty and potential litigation about what constitutes a quorum of
the Senate 4 Moreover, the Seventeenth Amendment provides only for
immediate appointments to fill vacancies in the Senate; it does not
address the scenario in which a substantial number of senators are
incapacitated . In the case of a biological attack on Washington, D.C.
leaving a majority of senators incapacitated, for example, it could take an
extended period of time to fill those seats through general elections or
resignations (and gubernatorial appointments) where senators ultimately
conclude that they will be unable to return to their duties 6
Although the possibility of the Senate being without a quorum is cause
for concern with regard to filling vacancies throughout the government,
the Constitution provides a mechanism for making appointments to most
(if not all) offices without the advice and consent of the Senate. 7 In the
event that the Senate is unable to convene to provide "Advice and
Consent," the President might temporarily fill vacancies through recess
appointments.28  The Recess Appointments Clause provides: "The
President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session., 29 In this way, the President
could seek to replace any deceased Justices immediately, regardless of
the state of the Senate.0 The newly appointed Justices would then serve
until the end of the Senate's next session when presumably the federal
government will have reached a new equilibrium.3 Presidents have used
the recess appointment power to fill over 300 vacancies on the federal
bench, including fifteen recess appointments of Supreme Court Justices)2
24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. The Constitution states: "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from
day to day . I..." d. (emphasis added). Both the House and the Senate have interpreted a
"majority" to mean a majority of living members, as opposed to a majority of seats.
However, this interpretation is subject to challenge and would not address the problem of
living but incapacitated members. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 2.
26. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (describing the general election for U.S. senators).
27. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Bush Uses Recess Appointments to Put Nominee on Court, CNN.COM., at
http://us.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/20/bush.pryor (last visited Mar. 14, 2004); see also 2 JOAN
BISKUPIC & ELDER WiTI, GUDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 861 (3d ed. 1997).
2004] 1021
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Soon after the Supreme Court was created, George Washington made a
recess appointment of John Rutledge as Chief Justice.3 More recently,
President Eisenhower made recess appointments of Chief Justice
14Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Stewart. In each of those cases,
except for Chief Justice Rutledge, the Senate took up the nomination of
the recess appointee as soon as it reconvened and confirmed the
nominee."
On first glance, therefore, it may appear that the Constitution provides
an adequate continuity scheme for the Supreme Court. Vacancies may
be filled through the normal appointment process, and if the Senate is
unable to convene to provide advice and consent, the President may use
the recess appointment power. There are, however, significant
constitutional questions about using the recess appointment power under
these circumstances. For example, there is some debate over whether
the Recess Appointments Clause can be read to allow for the recess
appointment of Article III judges given the constitutional guarantee of
36life tenure. The two courts of appeals that have addressed this question• 37
have both held that Article III judges can serve as recess appointees.-
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally held that
such recess appointments violated the Life Tenure Clause, it then
reversed course on rehearing en banc.3" The Supreme Court has yet to
confront the issue, which leaves some uncertainty in relying on recess
appointments to restore a quorum to the Court in the aftermath of an
attack.39 In addition, there remains a question as to whether the Senate
could even be "in recess" if no official recess was declared before the
33. STUART BUCK et al., JUDICIAL RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A SURVEY OF THE
ARGUMENTS 2, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/pdf/recapp.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2004); see also LEE EPSTEIN et al., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENT 292 (1994).
34. See EPSTEIN, supra note 33. Following President Eisenhower's recess
appointments to the Court, the Senate issued a sense-of-the-Senate resolution stating:
[T]he making of recess appointments to the Supreme Court, though authorized
by the Constitution, is not wholly consistent with the best interests of the
Supreme Court, the nominee who may be involved, the litigants before the
Court, nor, indeed, the people of the United States, and ... such appointments,
therefore, should be avoided except under most unusual and urgent
circumstances.
S. Res. 334, 86th Cong. (1960).
35. See BUCK, supra note 33, app. A.
36. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1962).
37. Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009; Allocco, 305 F.2d at 709.
38. Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009.
39. See S. Res. 334.
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attack (and the Senate simply could not convene for lack of a quorum)-
although common sense certainly would support the use of the recess
appointments power in just such a circumstance. 40
Moreover, while these two mechanisms for filling vacancies have
worked with relatively few glitches for over 200 years, we have never had
• 41
to deal with a large number of vacancies on the Court at the same time.
Although the Court has been unable to hear cases for lack of a quorum
on several occasions during the last sixty years, in each of these cases,
specific recusals caused the absence of a quorum as opposed to vacancies
that would impact the Court's entire docket. 42 More importantly, like the
Seventeenth Amendment, the mechanisms in Article II only provide
procedures for filling vacancies on the Court; they do not allow the
President or Congress to replace Justices who are incapacitated.43 If four
or more Justices were incapacitated temporarily as a result of an attack,
for example, the President and Congress would be powerless to restore a
quorum. 44 In addition, both the Appointments Clause and the Recess
Appointments Clause require a sitting President to initiate the process
either through nomination or recess appointment." If the status of an
acting President were uncertain, or if the President were unable or
unwilling to initiate the process, no other mechanism exists in the
Constitution for filling vacancies on the Court.
Given the existing constitutional framework, a number of other
potential problems are apparent. First, delays might arise in filling
vacancies due to questions about Presidential succession or the absence
of a quorum in the Senate.46 Second, even if no continuity issues arise
with the other branches, the President-faced with an array of crises-
40. Executive Power-Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att'y Gen 20, 21-25 (1921); see
also COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, "RECESS OF THE SENATE," ETC., S. REP. No. 58-4389, at
2 (1905).
41. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
42. See Arizona v. United States Dist. Court, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983), affid for absence
of a quorum, 688 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S.
1191 (1983), affd for absence of a quorum, 673 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1982); Sloan v. Nixon,
419 U.S. 958 (1974), affd for absence of a quorum, 493 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1974); Prichard
v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950), affd for absence of a quorum, 181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.
1950); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 716 (1944), certifying questions to
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. See generally David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995 (2000) (discussing the problem of
incapacitated Justices).
44. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
45. U.S. CONST. art Ii, § 2, cls. 2-3.
46. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, THE CONGRESS 11-12 (May 2003),
available at http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/FirstReport.pdf.
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might delay compiling a list of candidates to fill multiple vacancies and,
for similar reasons, the confirmation process might drag on for months.
Third, assuming none of these difficulties occurs, there is still the
problem of a single President appointing a majority of the Justices at a
single time, when there might exist a particular need for the judiciary to
act as a check on executive responses to a national crisis, or possibly
making recess appointments of a majority of Justices without any input
from the Senate.47 The question then becomes whether these scenarios
are sufficiently likely to occur and whether the consequences are
sufficiently severe that we ought to reevaluate that framework now.
Despite these potential difficulties, a number of factors caution against
meddling with the structure created by the Framers that has served our
country so well for over 200 years. As Justice Kennedy's and Judge
Katzmann's remarks suggest, unlike the other branches of government,
the federal judiciary is widely dispersed and its powers are highly
48decentralized. If the Supreme Court could not function for lack of a
quorum, federal courts throughout the country would still be able to
decide cases and order necessary relief.49 For example, the All Writs Act
provides that "[tihe Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law."50 Furthermore, as explained above, a statutory framework already
exists for dealing with cases when the Supreme Court does not have a
quorum-the decision of the court of appeals or the state supreme court
would be affirmed, albeit without precedential effect." Many cases are,
in relevant respects, similarly resolved as a matter of course because the
Supreme Court's docket is, with only rare exception, discretionary.52
There are thousands of cases each year in which the court of appeals or
the state supreme court provides the final word in the matter)3 In a
sense, therefore, there is already a contingency plan in place for
continuity of the Supreme Court.
In addition, the history of the Supreme Court shows that in many cases
where there has been a national crisis that has resulted in litigation
(either suits challenging the constitutionality of government action in
responding to the crisis or questions of statutory interpretation that arise
47. Executive Power-Recess Appointments, supra note 40, at 21.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
50. Id. § 1651(a).
51. Id. §§ 1651,2109.
52. See Stevens, supra note 14, at 10-11.
53. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
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in connection with the crisis), a substantial amount of time has elapsed
while the cases wind through the lower courts to the Supreme Court.
The most recent example of this is the post-September 11 cases involving
the detention and prosecution of "enemy combatants." On November
10, 2003, the Court granted certiorari to hear the cases of several
detainees of Guantanamo Bay who challenged the government's right to
detain them without access to U.S. courts,54 and the Court heard oral
argument in these cases on April 20, 2004. 5' The decision to grant
certiorari in these cases came nearly two years after the September 11
attacks and approximately eighteen months after the appellants were
detained in Afghanistan and transported to Guantanamo Bay. 6
Similarly, the Court heard argument in Korematsu v. United States7 on
October 11 and 12, 1944-over two and a half years after President
Roosevelt issued the executive orders authorizing the Japanese
internment.- While the delay in resolving these issues of civil liberties is
unfortunate, it is significant that the Supreme Court is often a latecomer
in dealing with national crises.
Not only is there often substantial delay before cases reach the Court,
but there have been times in the Supreme Court's history when it has
been unable to convene-in a few circumstances even for an entire
Term-and there is no evidence that the absence of the Court either
created a constitutional crisis or further exacerbated an existing crisis. In
1802, for example, the Court did not meet for fourteen months because
Congress had cancelled the June and December Terms of Court.'9
During that time, the Court was unable to hear and decide Marbury v.
Madison,60 which represented a pressing issue even if limited to a case
about the validity of the midnight judges' commissions. In 1811, the
Court was forced to cancel the entire Term of Court for lack of a
54. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.).
55. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2686 (2003).
56. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.). Additionally, the Court granted
certiorari in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, approximately twenty-seven months after Hamdi's
capture and detention. 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981
(2004). The Court granted certiorari in Padilla v. Rumsfeld approximately twenty-seven
months after Padilla's arrest. 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2nd Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
1353 (2004).
57. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
58. See id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 85 (1943). Hirabayashi was heard over a year after the relevant action was taken.
Id.
59. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 3, 2 Stat. 156, 157.
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
61. Id. at 138.
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62quorum. During that time, the Court held over deciding several cases-
such as United States v. Hudson & Goodwin63 and M'Kim v. Voorhies6-
until a quorum was restored for the 1812 Term.
Together these factors suggest that the judiciary is, indeed, the least
vulnerable branch and that we may not need to worry about the
continuity of the Court. The geographic distribution of federal courts
combined with the dispersion of judicial power certainly provides
reassurance that an attack on Washington, D.C. could not disable the
judicial branch as a whole. In addition, historical experience suggests
that the country can weather delays in receiving final judgment from the
Supreme Court even on questions of national importance.
Nonetheless, the circumstances surrounding a catastrophic attack on
Washington, D.C. and its aftermath could present unique challenges and
stresses on our constitutional framework that need to be addressed
immediately. During a state of national emergency, particularly if a
substantial segment of the federal government is disabled, constitutional
questions will likely arise that are of a different order than those
addressed in the usual course. A greater likelihood exists that during this
type of crisis, constitutional issues will arise that must be addressed
promptly and conclusively for fear of further damaging the stability and
security of the federal government. For example, in the type of
nightmare scenario that could result in the death of the President, Vice
President, members of the Cabinet, and members of Congress, serious
questions about Presidential succession requiring immediate and
conclusive resolution might well arise. Similarly, if a large-scale
biological, chemical, or nuclear attack caused the executive branch to
resort to extreme measures, such as using the military to maintain order
62. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL 399-400 (1996). The Court was
made up of seven Justices at the time, and under the Judiciary Act of 1801, had a quorum
requirement of four. Id. at 400. After Justice Cushing passed away in 1810, the Court was
left with six Justices. See id. at 399-400. Justice Chase was too ill to attend the Court and
Justices Johnson and Todd failed to return to Washington from riding circuit in time for
the beginning of the Term, leaving the Court without a quorum. Id. at 400. President
Madison had a great deal of difficulty filling Justice Cushing's seat. See id. His first three
nominees were either rejected by the Senate (Alexander Wolcott) or declined to serve
after being confirmed (Levi Lincoln and John Quincy Adams). Id. at 399-400. Eventually
Justice Story was confirmed and accepted Justice Cushing's seat; Justice Duvall replaced
Justice Chase, and a quorum was restored for the 1812 Term. Id. at 401.
63. 11 U.S. (Cranch) 32 (1812) (concerning federal court common law jurisdiction
over criminal cases).
64. 11 U.S. (Cranch) 279 (1812) (concerning state court jurisdiction to enjoin a
judgment of the circuit court of the United States).
65. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 32; see also M'Kim, 11 U.S. at 281.
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in part of the country or quarantining part of the population, prompt and
final judicial resolution might prove critical.
In fact, there are numerous examples in the Nation's history when the
Supreme Court has been called upon to resolve an issue of profound
national importance on an expedited schedule. During World War II,
when eight German saboteurs were captured on American soil and tried
by military commission (six were sentenced to death), the Court
convened a special Term within weeks of the conclusion of their trial to
hear a challenge to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal 6 6  After
President Truman seized the Nation's steel mills to prevent a strike by
steelworkers from interfering with the Korean War effort, the Supreme
Court heard a challenge to that action just over a month after the
• 67
Executive order was issued. The Pentagon Papers case was heard and
decided within five days of the government's attempt to enjoin
681publication. Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed the dispute
over the 2000 Presidential election twice in less than two months.69
Moreover, in the vast majority of significant cases that took an extended
period to find their way to the Supreme Court in the past, the Court was
still in place during that process, waiting its turn and lending its
legitimacy to the federal judiciary.70 After a terrorist attack, however, if
uncertainty exists concerning the Supreme Court's ability ultimately to
review the decision of the lower courts, the force of any orders from the
lower courts might be undermined 7
The current mechanism for resolving cases when the Supreme Court
lacks a quorum may also produce a worst case scenario during times of
national crisis.72 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2109, the lack of a quorum leads to
affirmance of the decision of the lower court without precedential effect,
making it possible that unsatisfied litigants will pursue their claims in
another circuit or in multiple venues. 73 As a result, the current system
66. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1942). The Court announced its decision from
the bench on the day oral argument concluded, although it did not file a formal opinion
until three months later. Id. at 20. We express no opinion on whether it was prudent for
the Court to issue a decision without first testing its conclusions through the opinion-
writing process.
67. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-84 (1952).
68. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
69. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100 (2000).
70. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2000).
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may also produce conflicting decisions from different circuits without a
final arbiter in place able to resolve the conflict.
7 4
Finally, even if a quorum could be restored in time to resolve these
important issues, either through recess appointments or quick
confirmations, there may still be a question of the Court's legitimacy in
the eyes of the public. 75 If all or most of the Justices were appointed by
the same President at a time when the Senate was either unable or
reluctant to exercise its authority to give advice and consent, the public
might well perceive the Court as a tool of the executive branch or as
inadequately vetted.76 At a time when the need for checks and balances
by a coequal branch may be most pronounced, the country cannot afford
the perception that the Court is not exercising rigorous, independent
77judicial review.
II. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONTINUITY
OF THE SUPREME COURT?
Assuming the current constitutional and statutory framework is
inadequate to provide needed continuity in the aftermath of an attack
resulting in the death or incapacitation of four or more Supreme Court
Justices, we need to clarify the nature of the problem so that we can
identify and evaluate possible solutions. As discussed above, the scope
of the problem depends on the impact of the attack on the other
branches of government. If the Senate cannot convene, the President's
ability to fill vacancies on the Court through the standard appointment
process will be delayed. If the Senate cannot convene because a majority
of senators are incapacitated, additional problems for the appointment of
Justices might arise. Similarly, if the line of Presidential succession has
reached the point of a minor Cabinet officer, or if there were competing
claims on Presidential succession, then the legitimacy of any
appointments to the Court will be undermined in the eyes of the public.
Setting aside these variables, however, a core problem exists in all the
doomsday scenarios. The challenge is essentially how to reconcile two
equally important, but often conflicting, goals: restoring the Court to a
quorum as quickly as possible, while at the same time preserving its
legitimacy as an independent and coequal branch of government.
78
Striking the right balance between these goals is crucial in order to create
74. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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a reconstituted Court that can effectively exercise its constitutional role
during a time of intense pressures and challenges to the Nation's values,
political institutions, and civil liberties. Unlike the other branches,
"[t]he judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the purse,
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can
take no active resolution whatever.""9 Therefore, the Court must rely
exclusively on its constitutional status and legitimacy to carry out its
decisions.8 '
Some proposed solutions favor legitimacy at the cost of delay, while
others promise a quick return to a functioning Supreme Court at the
expense of a decrease in the legitimacy of the Court as an institution. 
2
For example, although quick recess appointments at the President's
prerogative followed by confirmation hearings as soon as the Senate is
able to convene would avoid a delay in restoring a quorum, the decisions
of a Court dominated by recess appointees would likely be seen as less
legitimate than those of a Court reconstituted after deliberation by the
83Senate. Conversely, if the President refrained from making recess
appointments and waited until the Senate reconstituted to begin the
confirmation process, the legitimacy of the newly constituted Court
would be enhanced at the cost of delay in establishing a Court to review
pressing issues.4
There are other interests and goals at stake that need to be taken into
account as well. For example, we should avoid solutions that require
amending the Constitution unless necessary.9 Aside from the practical
concerns associated with adopting a constitutional amendment, there is
the interest in preserving the Constitution as a document of general
principles and structure that, where possible, leaves particular issues to
the Congress to resolve. Furthermore, even with a statutory fix, there
are a host of definitional problems that will need to be addressed, such as
deciding: (1) what circumstances trigger any new procedures that would
be enacted; (2) how to return to the status quo once the crisis subsides;
79. See id.
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Casey &
James McCellan eds., 2001).
81. See id.
82. See generally Continuity Commission, supra note 3 (discussing four approaches to
Supreme Court continuity and the advantages and disadvantages of each).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See U.S. CONST. art. V. We assume for purposes of this analysis that a
constitutional amendment is extremely difficult to obtain, and consider it as an option only
to the extent that the result is significantly more attractive than any statutory options.
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and (3) whether the jurisdiction of any replacement court should be
816limited to the most pressing cases.
We ultimately conclude that there are serious enough gaps in the
existing structure that something should be done. However, we are also
reluctant to propose changes to our constitutional structure in response
to a worst-case scenario that (we can only hope) is highly unlikely.
Moreover, we are apprehensive about defining the problem in a way that
assumes the parties involved in the nomination and confirmation process
will behave as bad actors. We think it is far more likely that the
President and members of the Senate will rise to the occasion of a
national emergency and seek to address the crisis in a spirit of
bipartisanship and cooperation that would avoid many of these
difficulties.87
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF THE
SUPREME COURT
During a meeting of the Continuity of Government Commission in
September 2002, James C. Duff, a former Administrative Assistant to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, outlined four possible solutions to the problem
of the continuity of the Supreme Court in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack. 8 The first two of those options can be described as variations on
the status quo in that they rely, with only slight adjustments, on the two
mechanisms already provided for in the Constitution-the Appointments
Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause.89 The remaining two
options represent more significant departures in that they involve
designating replacements for the Justices in advance of a crisis91 We use
86. See generally Charles E. Rice, Statement of Opposition to the Continuity of
Government's Proposal, COALITION TO PRESERVE AN ELECTED CONGRESS, at
http://www.electcongress.org/articles/2003/rice-cog.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, supra note 80, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton observed:
The institution of delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue and
honor among mankind which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence; and
experience justifies the theory. It has been found to exist in the most corrupt
periods of the most corrupt governments .... [lI]t is as little to be doubted that
there is always a large proportion of the body which consists of independent and
public-spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils of the nation.
Id.
88. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cls. 2-3; Continuity Commission, supra note 3; infra
Part III.A-B.
90. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3: infra Part III.C-D.
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Mr. Duff's framework to structure our analysis, although we discuss
additional options.
A. The Appointment Process
Perhaps the easiest and least controversial solution to the continuity
problem is to stick as closely as possible to the existing mechanisms for
continuity on the Court, namely the Appointments Clause and the
Recess Appointments Clause.9' Under the status quo, the President
could use the Appointments Clause to restore a quorum to the Court in
the aftermath of an attack by nominating individual Justices to fill the
vacancies and submitting them for confirmation by the Senate.92 The
advantages of such an approach are clear. Because the Appointments
Clause requires the consent of the executive and legislative branches and,
once appointed, an Article III judge enjoys life tenure, Justices
appointed through this process have inherent legitimacy.93 They have the
endorsement of the President and the Senate through the confirmation
process, and they are insulated from political pressures by virtue of their
life tenure.94 At a time when newly appointed Justices may be called
upon to decide issues of extreme national importance, some possibly
going to the very heart of our system of government, having the advice
and consent of the Senate along with life tenure would protect the Court
from accusations that it is dominated by the executive branch.95 By
virtue of the historical pedigree of the appointments process itself, with
over 200 years of tradition, the Court's authority during a time of crisis
would be well preserved. Furthermore, the Appointments Clause, as
with the Constitution's other checks and balances, serves a disciplining
function on each of the other branches. The President, knowing that his
nominees will have to pass muster before the Senate, is more likely to
96
nominate candidates who will appeal to a broad segment of the country.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 2-3.
92. See id. cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (requiring the presence of six Justices for
quorum).
93. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court .... ").
94. See id.; see also id. art III, § 1 ("The Judges ... of the supreme ... Court[] shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour ... ").
95. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
96. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 80, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton argued:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer, that the
necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful though, in general, a silent
operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the
President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
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Similarly, in giving advice and consent, the majority in the Senate cannot
be too recalcitrant because the President retains the power to nominate a
replacement candidate. 97
One of the greatest strengths of the Appointments Clause-and as it
turns out, one of its drawbacks in these circumstances-is that it
permanently fills any vacancies on the Court.98 Unlike the Recess
Appointments Clause, which provides a temporary solution but then
requires the vacancies to be filled at the end of the next Senate session,
the appointments process has the advantage of ending with a lifetime
appointment for the Justices." As a result, the appointments process
avoids the potentially disruptive effect of changing personnel on the
Court in the middle of a national crisis. Assuming a quorum has been
restored through the appointments process and the reconstituted Court
carries the added legitimacy that comes with the Senate's advice and
consent, then life tenure ensures that the Court's authority will be
preserved and only grow over time as the crisis subsides. In addition,
life tenure ensures that during the national crisis, the newly appointed
Justices will be insulated from political pressures and popular opinion.
Life tenure can also be a serious liability, however, if the immediate
demands of a national emergency combined with political pressure not to
be obstructionist result in a less searching review by the Senate. If, for
example, the rush to fill vacancies in the aftermath of an attack or the
party composition of the surviving senators produced confirmations with
only minimal review, the public could perceive the Court as dominated
by ideological appointees who were not sufficiently vetted by the Senate
and who would enjoy life tenure. Even with searching oversight by the
Senate, the reconstituted Court might be seen as less legitimate than its
predecessors. To see how questions about the Court's legitimacy could
arise, one need only imagine a scenario in which a minor cabinet officer
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from
a view to popularity.
Id.
97. Id. According to Hamilton:
The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another,
to reject the one proposed, because they could not assure themselves that the
person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any
subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain that a future nomination
would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them ... [therefore]
it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused where there were not
special and strong reasons for the refusal.
Id.
98. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1.
99. See id. art. I1, § 2, cls. 2-3; id. art. III, § 1.
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assumed the Presidency and promptly appointed five of nine Justices.
The damage to the Court's legitimacy in the long run from such
appointments could be devastating."M
All of this, of course, assumes that the appointments process would run
relatively smoothly after an attack, but the reality of a catastrophic attack
on Washington, D.C. could render this option much less attractive. The
biggest flaw in the Appointments Clause as a continuity in government
provision is that it is time-consuming and can be contentious at a time
when the government may require a speedy restoration of the Court and
may not be well situated to weather the divisiveness of several
simultaneous confirmation battles. '  In order for the appointment
process to work, moreover, a number of factors must be in place: there
must be a President with the authority to nominate a candidate to fill the
vacancy; the President must be able to select a nominee and
communicate with the candidate; there must be a quorum in the Senate
so that it is able to convene and consider the nomination;" 2 and finally, a
majority of the Senate must vote to confirm the President's nominee.
Each of these steps creates the potential for significant delays and the
possibility of a breakdown in the appointment process."3  In the
aftermath of a terrorist attack, the line of Presidential succession may be
in doubt."" Even if the Presidency were clear, the Senate might not be
able to convene for some time to take up a nomination if it had suffered
substantial casualties during the attack.' 9 Assuming that the President
100. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
101. Id.
102. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2. Note, however, that the standing rules of the Senate
authorize individual committees to conduct hearings and vote on nominations even during
a recess. See COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 107-1, at 39
(2001). "Each standing committee, including any subcommittee of any such committee, is
authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the
sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate." Id. Therefore, while the full
Senate would not be able to vote on a nominee until a quorum was restored, assuming
enough members of the Judiciary Committee were still available, a significant part of the
confirmation process could take place in advance of that point. Id.
103. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
104. See John Forters, President Micheal Armacost, THE BROOKINGS REVIEW, Vol.
54, No. 4, Fall 2003, at 33.
105. See id. Special appointments of replacement senators under the Seventeenth
Amendment would certainly speed-up the process of restoring a quorum to the Senate.
However, if governors are able to appoint replacements from their own political party,
regardless of the party affiliation of the deceased senator, some of the added legitimacy
provided by the advice and consent of the Senate may be diminished by the public's
perception that the Senate has been filled with appointees who do not represent the same
values as those who were elected. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMMISSION, supra note
46, at 23.
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and the Senate are functioning, filling vacancies on the Court may not be
the first priority for either branch."6 And even if the Senate is willing
and able to take up the nominations of several Supreme Court nominees,
the process is bound to be time-consuming, particularly if there are
highly controversial issues looming on the horizon that will soon be on
the Court's docket. Therefore, while the Appointments Clause has the
benefit of added legitimacy, it comes at the cost of a significant risk of
delay.
In order to address the risk of delay, commentators have suggested
slight modifications to the appointments process that might serve to
move it along. °7 One such modification would be to impose a time limit
on the confirmation process. ' ( According to this proposal, during a time
of national crisis or when the Court is without a quorum as the result of a
national emergency, a time limit of, for example, one month, would be
triggered after which the Senate would have to vote on the nominee.,°9
This proposal raises two questions: first, is such a modification advisable,
and second, would it require a constitutional amendment? As for
whether a time limit is a good idea, we should keep in mind that it is only
a partial solution to the problems described above and potentially a very
minor solution. A time limit would not help the appointment process if
there is no clear President to make nominations or the Senate is unable
to convene." ° Only after those preconditions have been satisfied does
the issue of delay during the Senate's deliberations come into play. The
shortened confirmation process may also lead to the appointment of less-
qualified Justices whose qualifications have not been adequately
explored. More importantly, a time limit may have unintended
consequences that would make matters worse. By forcing a vote at the
end of the time period, undecided senators might feel compelled to vote
against a nominee rather than vote to confirm someone whom they have
not had the opportunity to investigate and question sufficiently. In that
situation, a few more weeks might be enough to satisfy the concerns of
the undecided, whereas a time limit might lead them to reject the
106. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3. In the immediate aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, Congress and the President were focused on legislation expediting
benefits for public safety workers killed or injured in the line of duty; appropriating
emergency funds for the City of New York; authorizing the use of military force; securing
the airports; compensating victims; and augmenting government powers to investigate and
combat terrorism. It is difficult to predict where confirmation hearings might fall in this
order of priorities, but it is fair to say that it is unlikely to be at the very top of the list.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See U.S. CONST. art. ll, § 2.
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nominee and cause more delay as a new nomination is made and the
confirmation process starts over again. In addition, a curtailed
confirmation process may cause the President's staff to spend less time
doing their own internal vetting process which could lead to
underqualified nominees, embarrassing discoveries, and further delay.
Congress could enact a statute setting forth a time limit for the
Senate's deliberations during a time of national crisis. Such a statute,
however, would be constitutionally unenforceable. The Appointments
Clause requires the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" without
qualifying its discretion in any way."' Any time limit imposed likely
would be inconsistent with the discretion that the Framers delegated to
the Senate. ' Moreover, if the Senate were to fail to act in the prescribed
time, that omission could not substitute for the constitutional
requirement of advice and consent. A constitutional amendment
implementing such a time limit is not only impractical, but also costly in
comparison to the minimal gain in continuity."' A more feasible method
would be for the Senate to adopt its own internal rule limiting the time
for debate on Supreme Court nominees during a time of crisis."4 In the
same way that the Senate's cloture rules modify its discretion to give
advice and consent, a Senate rule could require a vote after a certain
amount of debate."
5
B. Recess Appointment Power
The other existing continuity mechanism to consider is the Recess
Appointments Clause, which grants the President the "Power to fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session."'"1 6 Thus, if there were vacancies on the Court precluding a
quorum and the Senate were unable to give advice and consent because
111. See id.
112. See id. cl. 2. One might also argue that the Recess Appointments Clause acts as
its own time limit because the President can always make a recess appointment if the
Senate fails to vote up or down before the next recess. Id. The structure of Article II,
Section 2, therefore, suggests that other than the President's ability to make a recess
appointment, the Framers did not intend for there to be any limit on the Senate's ability to
give advice and consent. See id. A counter-argument to this would be that Article II,
Section 2 describes the President's power to make appointments and only qualifies that
discretion with the advice and consent requirement; it does not grant the Senate unbridled
discretion to consider a nominee indefinitely. Id. (emphasis added).
113. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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it lacked a quorum as well, the President might seek to use his recess
appointment power to fill those vacancies until the end of the next
Senate session.117 Using the Recess Appointments Clause has the
advantage of speed, but it comes at some cost to legitimacy." 8 Although
the President might quickly fill any vacancies without having to worry
about the state of the Senate or a prolonged confirmation process, a
Supreme Court with four or more recess appointees would clearly have
less credibility in the eyes of the public and state and local
governments." 9 Without the check of Senate approval, multiple recess
appointees on the Court would be suspect.'2 ' With the prospect of future
confirmation hearings at the end of the next session, their decisions could
be portrayed as the product of political pressures. 12' Alternatively, they
might be seen as unduly tied to the executive, lacking the imprimatur of
Senate approval. This diminished legitimacy would tarnish the Court's
rulings at a time when its authority would be needed most. Also, the
recess appointments could last for a significant amount of time,
considering that the appointment continues until the end of the next
Senate session.' 2  If the Senate were to continue the current session after
it reconvened, the recess appointments would last over a year. At the
end of the next Senate session, moreover, the Court would face another
dramatic upheaval in its membership as all of the recess appointees
would either face confirmation or be replaced with new nominees. 21
In addition, there are open constitutional questions that could cast a
cloud over the Court or lead to disruptive litigation in the middle of the
national emergency. First, it might be argued that the Senate cannot
adjourn if it has not declared a recess and the Senate cannot declare a
recess without a quorum present.' 24 Therefore, although at odds with
common sense, there is some risk that an attack on Congress that either
killed or incapacitated a substantial number of senators could leave the
Senate stuck in session and thereby preclude the exercise of the
117. See id.
118. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
123. Id.
124. See id. art. I, § 5. In addition, Article I, Section 5 provides that "[n]either House,
during the Session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more
than three days... " Id. Without a quorum in the House to provide consent, therefore,
the Senate may be unable to declare an official recess.
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President's recess appointment power.' 21 Second, the Supreme Court has
yet to resolve the question of whether Article III judges may receive
recess appointments or whether the time limit on their service violates
the Life Tenure Clause.
Commentators have proposed making certain modifications to the
recess appointment power in order to address the legitimacy issue. 11
One such proposal is to require the President to make recess
appointments only after consultation with members of the Senate.' 27 If
the entire Senate is unable to give advice and consent, such a proposal
would require the input of the Senate leadership or a subset of the
surviving senators. Another proposal limits the number of recess
appointees from any one major political party. 2 " According to this
proposal, no more than a bare majority of the recess appointees could be
selected from the same political party as the President.'2 9
It is clear that both of these proposals, if anything more than precatory,
would require a constitutional amendment. 30 The Constitution states
that the President "shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate."' 3 ' While there is no relevant
commentary from the Framers on the extent of the President's recess
appointment power, 3 2 it is clear that the language of the Clause does not
qualify that power except to create a time limit on the duration of the
appointment.' 3 Requiring the President to consult with members of the
125. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 40. In this report, the Senate
Judiciary Committee interpreted a recess to be "the period of time when the Senate is not
sitting in regular or extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary
session for the discharge of executive functions." Id.: see also Executive Power-Recess
Appointments, supra note 40, at 21-22 (stating that the question of whether the Senate is
in recess for purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause "is whether in a practical sense
the Senate is in session so that its advice and consent can be obtained"). Although this
provides some support for a more pragmatic interpretation of a recess, it would not be
binding on a court's interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause.
126. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
132. See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL (Sept. 7, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 540 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). See also United
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008. 1017 (9th Cir. 1985) (Norris, J., dissenting) ("The
contemporaneous writings of the Framers are virtually barren of any references to the
Recess Appointments Clause. Although the record contains a few scattered references to
the Clause, it was never explained, debated or discussed in any meaningful way.").
133. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2.
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Senate or limiting the President's choices based on political party
affiliation would represent a significant infringement on the power
delegated to the President under Article 11.134 During a time of national
crisis, the President would likely decide to consult with the leadership of
the Senate before making any recess appointments, and would decline to
take advantage of a large number of vacancies on the Court to stack it
with Justices on either extreme of the ideological spectrum. Without a
constitutional amendment, however, these would have to be purely
voluntary steps on the part of the President.'34
Assuming a constitutional amendment would be feasible, there is still
the issue of whether it makes sense as a policy matter to modify the
recess appointment power in this way. Requiring a balance in terms of
political party affiliation is more susceptible to criticism because it has
both definitional problems and likely would have unintended negative
consequences. 36 First, it might at times prove difficult to determine and
verify an appointee's political party affiliation.137 Although there are
several non-Article III courts and independent agencies that have
statutory limits on the number of appointees from a given party, 38 these
are bodies that, unlike the courts, tend to draw from candidates who
outwardly identify as members of a particular political party 9 Judges,
who form the most substantial pool of prospective nominees, tend not to
wear their party loyalty (if any) on their sleeves.141' Moreover, while party
affiliation might correlate with judicial philosophy and, therefore, a party
balance requirement might lead to an ideologically balanced Court, this
is not necessarily the case-and it has proved unreliable, particularly with
regard to Supreme Court appointments.' 4' Second, such a requirement
would over-politicize the appointment process in a way that would do
harm to the Court's legitimacy.14 By enacting into law a presumption
that Justices will decide cases based on their preconceived ideologies and
party commitments, we would institutionalize the perception that
Justices are political actors and outcome driven. "43 In addition, Justices
134. Id.
135. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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appointed to create a balance of political party representation might feel
compelled to vote along party lines to maintain that balance.
Regarding a requirement that the President consult with members of
the Senate before making a recess appointment, this is less obviously
problematic, but may be infeasible as a practical matter. ' " We simply
cannot predict the status of the Senate leadership in the aftermath of an
attack, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to compel meaningful
consultation. Therefore, the consultation requirement may provide a
false promise of legitimacy that is outweighed by the cost of obtaining a
constitutional amendment.
Finally, both the Appointments Clause and the Recess Appointments
Clause suffer from an additional problem that renders them inadequate
to ensure the continuity of the Court even as modified along the lines
described above. Neither the appointment power nor the recess
appointment power address the problem of incapacitated Justices.1 4' The
Life Tenure Clause guarantees that even incapacitated Justices cannot be
removed from the Court unless they resign or are impeached.4 Thus, at
least where Supreme Court Justices are temporarily incapacitated in a
terrorist attack, the Appointments and Recess Appointments Clauses
provide no solace.
C. Lowering the Quorum Requirement
There may be a far easier way to address the absence of a quorum on
the Court. Rather than attempting to fill vacancies at a time of crisis
when there are likely to be substantial delays or legitimacy concerns,
Congress might eliminate the need to fill those vacancies by lowering the
number of Justices that constitute a quorum, thereby allowing the Court
to hear and decide cases with fewer Justices present.
47
The current quorum requirement for the Supreme Court is set by
statute at six Justices. 48 While it is difficult to imagine the Supreme
144. Id.
145. See Garrow, supra note 43, at 997 (discussing the problem of incapacitated
Justices).
146. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 1; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (stating "[t]he 'good Behaviour' Clause guarantees that Article
III judges shall enjoy life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment") (citations
omitted). We do not address the question of whether a permanently disabled Justice who
is unable to resign-such as a Justice in an irreversible coma-could be replaced short of
impeachment or, indeed, whether impeachment would be appropriate in such a case.
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
148. Id. (stating "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief
Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a
quorum").
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Court deciding cases with three or five Justices, nothing in the
Constitution prevents it. The Constitution mandates the creation of a
Supreme Court, but does not specify the number of Justices or set a
quorum requirement. 4 9 The number of seats on the Court has varied
over the years from six at its creation by the Judiciary Act of 1789, to
seven in 1807, nine in 1837, ten in 1863, back down to seven in 1866, and
finally settling at nine in 1869." The quorum requirement has changed
accordingly.' When the Court consisted of six members, for example,
the quorum requirement was four. 52
Without a quorum, the Court cannot convene to decide cases, and
unless a majority of the remaining Justices determines that a given case
can be heard by a quorum during the "next ensuing term," the decision
of the lower court is affirmed but without precedential effect.'" If a
terrorist attack disabled the government for a substantial period of time,
the absence of a quorum could result in a number of questions of
extreme national importance and urgency being decided by individual
courts of appeals or state supreme courts without any final arbiter in
place to resolve conflicts or provide the final word on the question. 5 4 By
lowering the quorum requirement, however, in all but the most extreme
scenarios, there would be a sufficient number of Justices remaining to
hear and decide the issues.
This proposal calls for Congress to pass a statute amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1 to lower the quorum requirement under certain specified
circumstances.'55 With regard to the optimal number for a quorum in
these circumstances, it seems clear that we would not want a single
Justice acting as the Supreme Court and deciding cases with the full
precedential force of the Court's decisions.5 6 By the same token, a two-
Justice Court would raise the same legitimacy concerns and could create
a potential for split decisions that would leave us in the same place as the
current statutory framework. A quorum of three Justices, however,
149. See U.S. CONST. art. IlI.
150. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73: Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, § 5, 2
Stat. 420, 421; Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176, 176; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, § 1,
12 Stat. 794, 794; Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209; Act of Apr. 10, 1869,
ch. 22, § 1, 26 Stat. 44, 44.
151. See supra note 150.
152. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2109.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (currently setting quorum at six Justices).
156. See Locks v. Commanding Gen., Sixth Army, 89 S. Ct. 31, 32 (1968) (stating that
"apart from granting stays, arranging bail, and providing for other ancillary relief, an
individual Justice ... has no power to dispose of cases on the merits").
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would likely be sufficient, particularly since the current framework
allows cases to be decided by a three-judge panel of the court of
appeals."'
Assuming there would be support for lowering the quorum
requirement as a continuity mechanism, it would be difficult to justify
having the reduced Court review and decide all cases that would
otherwise be on the Court's docket. For routine cases involving private
disputes or even standard criminal appeals, the costs associated with
holding the case over to another Term or the risk of leaving an issue
unresolved because the decision below is affirmed without precedential
effect would not be sufficient to justify what is essentially an emergency
procedure . Therefore, any proposal along these lines would have to
include a provision limiting the Court's jurisdiction to cases of extreme
national importance and in need of immediate resolution.
Provided these definitional issues can be resolved, this proposal has
several advantages over the alternatives discussed so far. First, because
the quorum requirement is set by statute, it could be adjusted without
requiring a constitutional amendment. Second, the Court would be
made up of Justices who were nominated by the President, confirmed by
the full Senate, and served as sitting Justices prior to the crisis. Third,
there would be no delay in hearing and deciding cases because as soon as
the Chief Justice is able to determine how many Justices have survived
157. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (providing that "[ijn each circuit the court may
authorize the hearing and determination of cases and controversies by separate panels,
each consisting of three judges, at least a majority of whom shall be judges of that court");
Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co., 459 U.S. 1190 (1983) (affirming a decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals due to absence of quorum); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 211 F.3d 853, 854 (4th Cir. 2000) (order denying an initial hearing en banc)
(Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (stating that per 28 U.S.C. § 46, "Congress has decided that
the basic unit for hearing an appeal from the judgment of a district court is a panel of
three"); Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 221 (1999) (stating that "[m]any court of appeals
procedures, including hearing cases in three-judge panels, can be traced to the procedures
of the courts that preceded them); see generally id. at 221-23 (discussing three-judge
panels).
158. See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform, Juggling Between Politics and
Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 876-80 (1994).
159. Cf Ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (order denying
a rehearing en banc) (Edwards, J., concurring). Justice Edwards stated:
The decision to grant en banc consideration is unquestionably among the most
serious non-merits determinations an appellate court can make, because it may
have the effect of vacating a panel opinion that is the product of a substantial
expenditure of time and effort by three judges and numerous counsel. Such a
determination should be made only in the most compelling circumstances.
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and whether that number meets the new quorum requirement, the Court
could resume its Term.' 60 Fourth, even if up to six Justices were
incapacitated, the Court could still hear and decide cases. Finally,
although nothing under this scheme would prevent the President from
making recess appointments during this time-and thereby stacking the
Court with handpicked Justices-by having a functioning Court in place,
this proposal would go a long way toward eliminating any justification for
such appointments (at least on a mass basis) and would thereby create a
significant political disincentive to such strategic behavior.
However, a lower quorum requirement is not without its dangers. In a
situation where the three remaining Justices were all at one end of the
spectrum in their judicial philosophy, for example, a three-Justice Court
could fail to garner sufficient public respect."' Even without an
ideological imbalance, however, the decisions made by three Justices
might be seen as less authoritative than those made by a full complement
of nine.162 Nonetheless, the reduced quorum approach has considerable
merit. In the end, its one critical flaw is that it fails to account for those
cases in which not even three Justices remain able to serve after an
attack.
D. Create an Intermediate Court
As an alternative to lowering the quorum requirement, Congress could
designate particular individuals or offices in advance of an attack to fill
vacancies on the Court as they arise during a time of national crisis.163
This could be called the Presidential Succession Model of ensuring
continuity because, like the Presidential Succession Act, it would specify
an order of succession in advance of the need to restore the Court to a
160. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
161. See Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of
Professors Laurence Tribe and Cass Sunstein), [hereinafter Hearings], reprinted in Senate
Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nominations Process, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 439-52,
463-75 (2002) (testifying to the propriety and need of establishing ideological balance on
the Court).
162. Cf Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Foley, 640 F.2d 1335, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Robinson, J., dissenting with Edwards & Ginsburg, JJ.). Judge Robinson, joined by
Judge Edwards and then-Judge Ginsburg, stated that en banc courts "are convened only
when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative consideration and
decision by those charged with the administration and development of the law of the
circuit." Id.
163. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2000) (setting forth that "[tihe Chief Justice of the United
States may, in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge to act
as circuit judge in another circuit upon request by the chief judge or circuit justice of such
circuit").
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quorum.' 4 As with the option of lowering the quorum requirement, this
1proposal has the benefit of eliminating any delay in filling vacancies. '
Moreover, by designating replacements in advance of a crisis, this
proposal may solve the legitimacy problem by allowing for Senate
confirmation and removing the appointment decision from the exigencies
of the crisis.6
One suggestion along these lines is to have individuals who are
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate be, in effect,
reserve Supreme Court Justices. 6 These individuals could be nominated
to replace specific Justices or they could fill vacancies as they arise in
order of seniority. Under this scenario, the Senate could hold
confirmation hearings and deliberate on a normal schedule. This option,
however, raises a number of difficulties. First, it would likely require a
constitutional amendment because, once confirmed and appointed to
serve on the Supreme Court, Congress would lack the authority to then
limit the service of the "reserve" Justices to times of national crisis when
the Court would otherwise lack a quorum.6 8 Indeed, the Life Tenure
164. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000) (governing Presidential succession in the event of
vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice President).
165. Cf. id.; see also William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of
Presidential Succession: "The Emperor Has No Clones," 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1433-34 (1987).
The authors explain:
Although section 19 does not explicitly require the Speaker or President pro
tempore to take the presidential oath of office, the legislative history suggests
Congress assumed that the congressional officers would do so. By contrast,
section 19 clearly requires Cabinet officers to take the presidential oath of office
prior to succession to the Presidency, and specifies that taking the oath
constitutes resignation from Cabinet office.
Id.
166. Cf 3 U.S.C. § 19(e) (setting eligibility requirements on officers in the line of
succession). Section 19(a), (b), and (d):
[A]pply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the
Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers
appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of
the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the
President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the
House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of
President devolve upon them.
Id.
167. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § I (providing that "[i]n case of the removal of the
President from office or his death or resignation. the Vice President shall become
President").
168. Id. art. III, § 1; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (stating "the fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if is contrary to the Constitution.
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Clause would seem to preclude a law that would move reserve Justices in
and out of office based on external events.6 9 Second, for the same
reason that we are concerned about having one President appoint a
majority of the Court in the aftermath of an attack, we should also be
concerned about one President choosing all nine reserve Justices.
1 70
While this problem could be remedied by staggering the appointment of
reserve Justices, it would take decades to produce a full roster of
replacements which would defeat the purpose of the reserve Court.
Third, even if we could resolve this practical problem, a future President
might feel pressure to nominate one of the reserve Justices to fill a
vacancy on the Court that arose in the normal course. If not, then it
would seem that the authority of the reserve Justices might be
diminished by the fact of their being passed over for full appointment.
An alternative approach along these lines would be to designate
particular offices rather than individuals to fill vacancies on the Court.
For example, vacancies on the Court caused by a national emergency
could be filled by the chief judges of the courts of appeals in order of
their seniority.' This would solve the practical problem of a single
President appointing the reserve Justices, because the chief judges of the
various circuits will have already been appointed to the courts of appeals
by various presidents, and their designation as chief judge is beyond the
control of the sitting President.
72
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of
democratic government.").
169. See U.S. CONST. art. Ii, § 1 (stating "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office").
170. See, e.g., Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (1999) (noting in circuit court panels that
ideological imbalances "often lead to case outcomes that reflect partisan interests. Indeed,
there is now evidence that when a circuit court panel is unified with like-minded partisans
(3-0 panels of Democratic or Republican appointees), ideological voting is quite
pronounced, with neutral precedent often manipulated or ignored altogether.").
171. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2000) (authorizing district court judges to sit by
designation on the court of appeals). Section 292(a) states:
The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign one or more district judges
within the circuit to sit upon the court of appeals or a division thereof whenever
the business of that court so requires. Such designations or assignments shall be
in conformity with the rules or orders of the court of appeals of the circuit.
Id.
172. Id. § 45. This section states:
The chief judge of the circuit shall be the circuit judge in regular active service
who is senior in commission of those judges who- (A) are sixty-four years of age
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Nevertheless, this proposal would likely still require a constitutional
amendment.'73 Without a separate confirmation process, we would have
to assume that the confirmation of judges to the courts of appeals is
sufficient to encompass the Senate's advice and consent on their
nomination to the Supreme Court. While this might be possible going
forward, it certainly is not presently the case for judges sitting on the
courts of appeals. 74  In confirming those judges, the Senate did not
contemplate that they might be sitting on the Supreme Court.1
7
1
Although in certain circumstances the duties of an appointed official can
be expanded beyond those specified in his or her original appointment
without requiring a new confirmation process, 76 the role of a Supreme
Court Justice is too far afield of a court of appeals judgeship to fit within
this category. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Constitution would
permit Congress to enact a law that would, in essence, move judges on
and off the Supreme Court based on the number of vacancies and the
level of national crisis.
77
A more promising option that would avoid the need for a
constitutional amendment would be for Congress to create an inferior
tribunal that would convene only in times of national emergency, when
or under; (B) have served for one year or more as a circuit judge; and (C) have
not served previously as chief judge.
Id. Chief judges serve for a term of seven years and are required to serve after the
expiration of their term until another judge is eligible. Id. Additionally, no circuit judge
may serve as chief judge of the circuit after attaining the age of seventy. Id.
If the chief judge desires to be relieved of his duties as chief judge while retaining
his active status as circuit judge, he may so certify to the Chief Justice of the
United States, and thereafter the chief judge of the circuit shall be such other
circuit judge who is qualified to serve or act as chief judge.
Id.
173. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY
L.J. 281, 283-84 n.8 (2003).
174. 28 U.S.C. § 44.
175. See id.
176. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893). Writing for the Court,
Justice Shiras stated:
[W]e do not think that, because additional duties, germane to the offices already
held by them, were devolved upon them by the act, it was necessary that they
should be again appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It
cannot be doubted, and it has frequently been the case, that Congress may
increase the power and duties of an existing office without thereby rendering it
necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated and appointed.
Id.; see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170-76 (1994).
177. It is true that district court judges, at times, sit on the courts of appeals, but the
constitutional status of the Justices of the Supreme Court is likely sufficiently distinct that,
once qualified to sit on the Supreme Court, a Justice could not then be denied that
privilege.
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the Supreme Court was unable to hear cases for lack of a quorum. 11 This
intermediate court of appeals would be able to resolve circuit splits and
could act as a court of last resort in cases related to the national
emergency. The tribunal could include the remaining Supreme Court
Justices and draw from the chief judges of the courts of appeals, but its
jurisdiction would be narrowly defined and it could be convened only for
a limited duration until the Supreme Court could be reconstituted
through the normal appointment process.
As with the proposal to lower the quorum requirement, Congress
would need to define both the circumstances that trigger convening the
court and the scope of its jurisdiction. Out of concern that the court
might convene unnecessarily, Congress could require that a
supermajority of the court's members vote in favor of convening before
the court can hear cases.'7" 9 As for the scope of its jurisdiction, it seems
entirely unnecessary to have the court deciding, for example, ERISA
cases.'8 Therefore, its jurisdiction should be discretionary and limited to
cases of extreme national importance.
An intermediate court along these lines has all the benefits of lowering
the quorum requirement and may avoid some of the pitfalls of that
approach."" Establishing the court would not require a constitutional
amendment, because Congress already has the power under Article I,
Section 8 to create inferior tribunals.' 2 Although the Constitution makes
clear that there shall be only "one Supreme Court,"'' the duties of such a
new intermediate court would be sufficiently limited that it would not
constitute a second Supreme Court. Significantly, the Supreme Court,
once reconstructed, would have the clear authority to set aside the
precedents of the new intermediate court. Moreover, the mere fact that
the intermediate court would have the authority to settle legal issues in
the interim would not make it a second Supreme Court. Indeed, lower
courts frequently decide cases that are not subject to review and, even
where the Supreme Court cannot review one of those decisions for lack
178. See Continuity Commission, supra note 3; Paul Taylor, Alternatives to a
Constitutional Amendment: How Congress May Provide for the Quick, Temporary Filling
of House Member Seats in Emergency by Statute, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 373, 386 (2002). Over
the years, there have been various proposals to create an intermediate court of appeals
between the circuits and the Supreme Court.
179. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (authorizing Congress to "ordain and establish"
inferior courts).
180. See id. Congress would have the power under Article III to limit the Court's
jurisdiction to more pressing matters during an emergency. See id.
181. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
182. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
183. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
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of a quorum, no one would suggest that the lower court had become a
second Supreme Court. The members of this court would be drawn from
sitting Justices and judges who will have been nominated by a duly
elected President and confirmed by the Senate in advance of any national184
emergency. The court could convene and hear cases without delay
even if the Supreme Court lacked a quorum due to the incapacitation of
some of the Justices.
8 5
Moreover, by supplementing the surviving Justices with chief judges
from the courts of appeals chosen by seniority, an intermediate court is
less likely to be ideologically skewed.' 6 Even if the remaining Justices
would all be at one end of the ideological spectrum, adding to the
number of decisionmakers will increase the chances of a more
ideologically diverse decision-making body and more moderate
decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there is merit to either lowering the quorum requirement or
creating an intermediate court as a solution to the Supreme Court's
continuity problem, we ultimately recommend the latter because it
strikes the optimal balance between quick restoration and preserving the
Court's legitimacy. An intermediate court made up of the surviving
Justices and chief judges from the courts of appeals offers all the
advantages of both proposals, without the risk of ideological imbalance
that accompanies a three-member Supreme Court or the risk that not
even three Justices might be able to serve following an attack. This
option provides a relatively seamless transition to a fully functioning
court of last resort, makes use of the accumulated wisdom of the sitting
Justices, and likely would not require a constitutional amendment. The
Supreme Court is certainly the least vulnerable branch, but the Court's
ability to serve its constitutional function during a time of national crisis
and help weather the strains on the other branches would be greatly
enhanced by implementing this proposal.
184. Continuity Commission, supra note 3.
185. See id.
186. See Hearings, supra note 161.
187. See Cass Sunstein et al., IDEOLOGICAL VOTING ON FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, 44-45 (Sept. 2003) available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/policy/j udges/pdf/preliminary.pdf.
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